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JGG BARRERA v. DE LA TORRE [48 C.2d 
[L.A. No. 23875. In Bank. Mar. 22, 1957.] 
FELIX BARRERA et al., Appellants, v. ARMONDO A. 
DE LA TORRE, Respondent. 
[1] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The conditions of the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine are that the accident must be of a kind 
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's 
negligence, that it must be caused by an agency or instru-
mentality within defendant's exclusive control, and that it 
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution 
on plaintiff's part. 
[2] Automobiles- Instructions- Res Ipsa Loquitur.-Where an 
automobile driven by defendant went over the curb, across a 
sidewalk, through a fence and crashed against plaintiffs' house, 
regardless of whether, as defendant claimed, there was a prior 
collision between his car and another automobile with the 
consequent wresting of his car from his control and its strik-
ing plaintiffs' house, or whether, as plaintiffs claimed, their 
damages were occasioned by only one car, which was that of 
defendant, it could not be said as a matter of law that de-
fendant lost control of his automobile so as to render the 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine inapplicable, but these were matters 
for the jury to weigh in the light of the required conditions, 
and an appropriate instruction concerning the doctrine would 
have been proper. 
[3] Appeal-Objections-Instructions.-Plaintiffs who did not re-
quest an instruction on res ipsa loquitur may not argue on ap-
peal that the court erred in failing to give a specific instruc-
tion thereon. 
[4] !d.-Objections- Exceptions- Instructions.-A litigant may 
question the correctness of the charge to the jury though he 
made no complaint at the time of its occurrence. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 647.) 
[5] Automobiles- Presumptions and Inferences.-The mere fact 
that an automobile crashed into a house suggests negligence on 
the part of someone, though the factor of responsibility of any 
particular person may remain to be determined. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 123 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, 
§ 295 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, § 399. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 8] Negligence, § 133; [2] Automobiles, 
§355(5); [3] Appeal and Error, §193; [4] Appeal and Error, 
§ 214; [5] Automobiles, § 193(1); [6] Negligence, § 198(2); [7] 
Automobiles, § 355(1); [9] Automobiles, § 364; [10) Appeal and 
Error, § 120. 
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Negligence-Instructions-Presumptions and Inferences.-An 
instruction that the mere fact that an accident happened does 
not give rise to a legal inference that it was caused by negli-
gence or that any party to the accident was negligent should 
not be given where the undisputed eYidcncc shows that only 
one dangerous instrumentality was involved and sueh instru-
mentality was in defendant's exclusiye control. 
Automobiles-Instructions-Presumptions and Inferences.-In 
an action for damages to a house which was struck by de-
fendant's automobile, where there was evidence that two in-
strumentalities W(,l'e involved in the accident and it was ques-
tionable whether the conditions of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine 
were satisfied, an instruction that the mere fact that an acci-
dent happened does not give rise to a legal inference that it 
was caused by negligence or that any party to the accident 
was negligent would p<~rmit the application of the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine if the elements of that doctrine were found 
to be present, and since such an instruction would be proper 
when accompanied by an instruction on the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine, the same reasoning would indicate its propriety when 
not so accompanied, if given in a case in which it cannot be 
said as a matter of law that such doctrine was applicable and in 
which no instruction with respect to the doctrine was requested. 
[8] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The res ipsa loquitur doc-
trine concerns a type of circumstantial evidence on which 
plaintiff may rely to make out a prima facie case against de-
fendant. 
[9] Automobiles-Appeal-Objections-Instructions.-In an action 
for damages to a house which was struck by defendant's auto-
mobile, where there was sufficient evidence in the case from 
which the jury, whether instructed or not on the matter, could 
have drawn the inference that defendant was negligent if it 
had chosen to do so, and where there was also sufficient evi-
dence to support a finding that defendant was not negligent, 
plaintiffs may not, in the absence of any request for instruc-
tions on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, prevail in objections 
to the giving of an instruction that the mere fact that an acci-
dent happened does not give rise to a legal inference that it 
was caused by negligence or that any party to the accident 
was negligent, without an accompanying instruction on res 
ipsa loquitur. 
[10] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-In an 
action for damages to a house which was struck by defendant's 
automobile, plaintiffs may not for the first time on appeal 
change the theory of their cause of action from one of negli-
gence to one of trespass as ground of reversnl of an adverse 
judgment, the faets not being undisputed. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Ellsworth Meyer, Judge. Affirmed . 
.Action for damages to a house which was struck by an 
automobile. Judgment for defendant affirmed. 
Ernest V. Shockley and Edward Raiden for Appellants. 
Schell, Delamer & Loring and Fred B. Belanger for Re-
spondent. 
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs, husband and wife, appeal from a 
judgment for defendant entered on a jury verdict in an action 
brought to recover damages allegedly resulting from defend-
ant's negligent running of his automobile against plaintiffs' 
house. They contend that the trial court committed preju-
dicial error in the instructions to the jury, but we have con-
cluded that this contention cannot be sustained. Further-
more, we have concluded that there is no merit in the sugges-
tion of either plaintiffs or defendant that the question of 
whether defendant was or was not negligent was a question 
to be determined as a matter of law by the court rather than 
as a matter of fact by the jury. 
On November 7, 1953, about midnight, defendant was driv-
ing his automobile westerly on Third Street in Los Angeles. 
Beyond the intersection of that street with Arizona Street 
his automobile went over the curb, across the sidewalk, 
through a chain-link fence, and crashed against plaintiffs' 
house. Third Street runs east and west and is about 75 feet 
wide . .Arizona Street runs north and south and is about 50 
feet wide. There was a boulevard stop sign on Arizona Street 
at the south entrance of the intersection. 
Defendant was the only eyewitness to the accident. He 
testified that when he was about 20 feet east of the inter-
section and traveling west at a speed of approximately 20 
miles per hour, he saw an automobile on Arizona Street 
traveling north; that it was then about 50 feet south of the 
intersection, which was "back from the boulevard stop" and 
to his left; that he glanced to his right, and then again to 
his left, at which time he saw the other automobile about 
8 to 10 feet from him, traveling at an estimated speed of 50 
miles per hour; that as he passed the center of the intersection, 
the other automobile struck the left rear fender of his auto-
mobile, knocking him off the driver's seat and to the floor-
board; that he then "must have touched the accelerator, as 
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[his] car gathered speed," and veered to the left, going 
"completely out of control," jumping over the south curb 
of Third Street, and striking plaintiffs' house, which was 
about 100 feet west of the intersection. Defendant further 
testified that after the accident, the driver of the other auto-
mobile "turned off his lights and ... sped away," with its 
"front bumper ... dragging on the ground"; that the other 
automobile was a 1941 Chevrolet because he went back to the 
corner and found there "part of a bumper and a piece of [its] 
skirt" so indicating, which articles the police later examined 
and took as evidence; that he saw a "brush mark" about 15 
feet long at the intersection, which was well lighted. 
One of the investigating officers, as a witness for defendant, 
testified that he arrived at the scene of the accident about 
12 :25 a. m.; that defendant was sober; that defendant told 
him that he had been struck by another automobile, when it 
"failed to stop at Third Street and drove into his left rear," 
causing "him to slide to the right-hand side of [his] car," 
so that he ''ran into the building and fence before he could get 
to the pedals''; and that defendant further stated that the 
other automobile's" front bumper was dragging on the ground 
as it left the scene." 
The parties first are in dispute as to whether or not the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable here. [1] They 
agree that the doctrine has these three conditions: (1) the 
11ccident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur 
in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must have 
been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the ex-
clusive control of the defendant; and ( 3) it must not have 
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part 
of the plaintiff. (Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811, 823 [291 
P.2d 915]; Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 489 [154 P.2d 
687, 162 A.L.R. 1258] ; Prosser on Torts, second ed. 1955 
(Hornbook Series), p. 201.) Obviously in this case conditions 
(1) and (3) were met. [2] Defendant claims that condition 
(2) was not met because when the other automobile struck 
his automobile in the intersection, his automobile went out 
of his control, jumped the curb and crashed into plaintiffs' 
house. The car then being out of his control, defendant 
contends that he cannot be held responsible for plaintiffs' 
damages under that doctrine. (McDonald v. Cantley, 214 
Cal. 40, 45 [3 P.2d 552]; Staples v. L. W. Blinn Lbr. Co., 
97 Cal.App. 387, 392 [275 P. 813].) This argument assumes 
that the jury was required to find that the accident happened 
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exactly as defendant testified. On the other hand, plaintiffs 
claim that defendant's explanation >vas highly improbable, 
being based upon au alleged collision between his and a 
"phantom car" ·with the consequent wresting of his ear from 
his eontrol and its striking plaintiffs' house. So far as they 
are eonccrned, plaintiffs claim their damages were occasioned 
bnt one ear, which was that of the defendant, and therefore 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was applicable. (Druzanich v. 
Criley, 19 Cal.2d 4;39, 444 [122 P.2d 53].) But regardless 
of whether there was or was not a two-ear collision in line 
1vith l1efendant 's account, it could not be said as a matter 
of law that defendant thereby lost control of his automobile 
so as to render the doctrine inapplicable. Rather these were 
all matters for the jury to weigh in the light of the required 
c:onditions, and an appropriate instruction eoneerning the 
dodrine would have been proper. (Sener'is v. Haas, supra, 
45 Cal.2d 811, 823.) 
[3] However, plaintiffs did not request an instruction on 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Under such circumstances 
they may not argue on appeal that the court erred in failing 
to give a specific instruction. (Lahti v. JYiclYlenamin, 204 Cal. 
415, 421 [268 P. 644]; JJiills v. Los Angeles Junk Co., 3 Cal. 
App.2d 546, 547-548 [40 P.2d 285]; Comstock v. JJ1orse, 107 
Cal.App. 71, 75 [290 P. 108.) [4] But, of eourse, they may 
question the correctness of the charge to the jury though they 
made no complaint at the time of its occurrence. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 647; Cook v. Los Angeles Ry. Cm·p., 13 Cal.2d 591, 594 
[91 P.2d 118].) 
Plaintiffs contend that the court erred in giving the 
following instruction: ''The mere fact that an accident hap-
pened, considered almw, does not give rise to a legal inference 
that it was caused by negligence or that any party to this 
aecident ·was mgligent." (BA,JI 1:31.) [5] Of eonrse, as a 
general comment on this instruction, the single faet of a ear 
erashing into a house, without more, does suggest negligence 
on the part of someone although the factor of responsibility 
of any particular person may still remain to be determined. 
But without emphasis on this portion of the instruction, 
plaintiffs elaim that the instruction preeluded the jury from 
eonsidering the applieation of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine 
in its possible relation to defendant. [6] It has been held that 
the challenged instruction should not be given where the 
undisputed evidence showed that but one dangerous instru-
mentality was involved in the happening of the accident 
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and such instrumentality was in the exclusive control of 
the defendant. In such ease where "it was conceded that the 
fatal bullet was fired by defendant, ... though instructions 
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were not requested, the 
jury should not have been foreclosed from considering the 
evidence provided by the happening of the accident itself in 
whether defendant was negligent." (Jensen v. 
44 Cal.2d 325, 329 [287 P.2d 7].) 
[7] However, in this case there was evidence that two 
instrumentalities were involved in the accident, and it was 
questionable whether the conditions of the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine were satisfied. A somewhat similar situation was 
presented in J}fiddleton v. Post Transp. Co., 106 Cal.App.2d 
703 [235 P.2d 855], where an instruction substantially the 
same as the one here criticized was given along with an instruc-
tion concerning the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In holding 
that no error was committed, the court said at page 705: 
"The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable 
in an action for personal injury does not deprive a defendant 
of his right to an instruction that the mere fact of injury 
is no evidence of his negligence or liability . . . such instruc-
tion called the attention of the jury to the rule of law that 
the mere happening of an accident, that is, separated from 
everything else shown by the evidence, will not support an 
inference of negligence on the part of defendant. This in-
struction does not conflict with the res ipsa loquitur instruc-
tion, for such instruction does not become applicable to a 
case unless several factors concur in addition to the mere 
happening of the accident: ... In the present case the jury 
was entitled to find that certain elements of the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur were not present; therefore such doctrine 
became inapplicable and the jury were properly advised that 
they could not draw an inference of negligence on the part 
of defendant merely because an accident had happened.'' 
(See also Silva v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 119 Cal.App.2d 
284, 287-288 [259 P.2d 743]; Bazzoli v. Nance's Sanitarimn, 
Inc., 109 Cal.App.2d 232, 241 [240 P.2d 672] ; Seedborg v. 
Lakewood Gardens etc. Assn., 105 Cal.App.2d 449, 455-456 
[233 P.2d 943].) 
It thus appears that the criticized instruction would per-
mit the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur if 
the elements of that doctrine were found to be present. Since 
such an instruction would be proper when accompanied by an 
instruction on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the same reason-
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ing would likewise indicate its propriety when not so accom-
panied, if given in a case in which it cannot be said as a 
matter of law that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was applicable 
and in which no instruction with respect to that doctrine was 
requested. [8] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur concerns a 
type of circumstantial evidence upon which the plaintiff may 
rely to make out a prima facie case of negligence against the 
defendant. [9] There was sufficient evidence in the present 
case from which the jury, whether instructed or not upon the 
matter, could have drawn the inference that defendant had 
been negligent, if it had chosen to do so. (Rose v. Melody 
Lane, 39 Cal.2d 481, 488 [247 P.2d 335] ; Fedler v. Hygelund, 
106 Cal.App.2d 480, 487 [235 P.2d 247] .) Had the jury 
done so, it could not be said that the evidence would not have 
supported its verdict; but, on the other hand, the jury here 
apparently found that defendant had not been negligent and 
there is ample evidence to support that finding. We conclude 
that in the absence of any request for instructions on the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, plaintiffs cannot prevail in their 
objections to the instructions given under the circumstances 
presented by the record. Furthermore, it appears from the 
foregoing discussion that the question of whether defendant 
was or was not negligent was essentially a question of fact 
for the jury's determination. 
[10] As a final point, plaintiffs suggest that they had a 
cause of action against defendant not only upon the theory 
of negligence but also upon the theory of trespass. They 
admit that this latter theory of liability was not presented 
either in the trial court or on appeal prior to the time 
of filing their supplemental brief in this court. They recognize 
the general rule that ordinarily a party may not, for the 
first time on appeal, change the theory of his cause of action 
(Ernst v. ScaTle, 218 Cal. 233, 240 [22 P.2d 715] ; Gray v. 
Janss Inv. Co., 186 Cal. 634, 641 [200 P. 401] ), but they 
suggest that this case should be an exception, relying upon 
Panopt~los v. JJfaderis, 47 Cal.2d 337 [303 P.2d 738]. How-
ever, the new legal theory in the Panopulos case presented 
only a question of law on undisputed facts, and it was deemed 
appropriate to pass upon its merits as a further basis for 
affirmance of the judgment. Here plaintiffs not only dispute 
defendant's version of the facts but, in addition, they ad-
vance this new theory of trespass as ground for reversal of 
the judgment for defendant. Such change of theory by an 
appellant cannot be permitted. (See Anderson v. Derrick, 
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220 Cal. 770, 777 [32 P.2d 1078]; Townsend v. Wingler, 114 
Cal.App.2d 64, 68 [249 P.2d 613] .) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., con-
curred. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority holds that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
could not be invoked to establish defendant's negligence as a 
matter of law; that the jury instruction contrary to the appli-
cation of the doctrine was not error; and that plaintiffs were 
not entitled to a reversal on the theory of trespass because 
it was not presented in the trial court. None of these positions 
is sound. 
The case presents a situation squarely and typically calling 
for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Not considering 
defendant's purported "explanation" of the accident for the 
moment, the evidence shows without dispute that defendant 
while driving his car along a city street drove it off the street, 
across the sidewalk, through a fence and into plaintiffs' yard 
and struck their home, causing the damage of which complaint 
is made; it is conceded that plaintiffs did not have, could not 
have had, anything whatsoever to do with the accident since 
houses, needless to say, cannot be moved about at the will of 
the owner to dodge cars which leave the street in front of a 
house. Defendant concedes he was the sole driver and opera-
tor of his car. In Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Cal.2d 439 [122 
P.2d 53], a car being driven by defendant left the highway 
and upset, injuring passengers in the car who had nothing to 
do with its operation; res ipsa loquitur was held applicable. 
To the same effect see Fiske v. Wilkie, 67 Cal.App.2d 440 
[154 P.2d 725], and cases there cited. In Godfrey v. Brown, 
220 Cal. 57 [29 P.2d 165, 93 A.L.R. 1092], the court held res 
ipsa loquitur available to a guest (before the change in the 
law as to the liability for injuries to guests) who was injured 
when the defendant driver-host collided at an intersection with 
another car driven by the other defendant (cited with ap-
proval in Ybarra v. Spanga1·d, 25 Cal.2d 486, 493 [154 P.2d 
687, 162 A.L.R. 1258]). Harlow v. Standard Imp. Co., 145 
Cal. 477 [78 P. 1045], held the doctrine applicable where an 
operator of a steam roller in a street ran it against and 
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damaged house. Merry v. Knudsen Creamery 
Oo., 94 Cal.App.2d 715 [211 P.2d 905], and cases there cited, 
applied the doctrine where a car ran into the rear of a 
stopped car. Price v. McDonald, 7 Cal.App.2d 77 [ 45 P.2d 
425], involved an unattended parked car moving and colliding 
with plaintiff's house. Defendant's car left the highway 
and went onto the sidewalk, injuring plaintiff who was on the 
sidewalk in Brandes v. Rucker-FuJler Desk Oo., 102 Cal.App. 
221 [282 P. 1009], and Smith v. Hollander, 85 Cal.App. 535 
[259 P. 958]. (See also Ireland v. Jfarsden, 108 Cal.App. 
632 [291 P. 912]; Brown v. Davis, 84 Cal.App. 180 [257 
P. 877].) 
There cannot be any doubt therefore that the doctrine was 
applicable in the instant case and the inference of negligence 
is very strong. It should also be observed that the jury cannot 
disregard the inference of negligence arising from res ipsa 
loquitur and if there is no showing of lack of negligence, it 
must find for the plaintiff. (Meyer v. Tobin, 214 Cal. 135 
[ 4 P.2d 542] ; Dierman v. Providence Hospital, 31 Cal.2d 
290 [188 P.2d 12] ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Oo., 42 Cal.2d 
682 [268 P.2d 1041]; Talbert v. Ostergaard, 129 Cal.App.2d 
222 [276 P.2d 880]; Hardin v. S01n Jose City Lines, Inc., 41 
Cal.2d 432 [260 P.2d 63]; Williams v. City of Long Beach, 
42 CaL2d 716 [268 P.2d 1061); Ward v. Silveria, 102 CaL 
App.2d 114 [226 P.2d 732].) Such showing must eliminate 
any possibility of negligence on the part of the defendant; if 
it fails to do so a verdict for defendant must be reversed. 
(Dierrnan v. Providence Hospital, supra, 31 Cal.2d 290; 
Druzanick v. Oriley, supra, 19 Cal.2d 439; Burr v. Sherwin 
Williams Oo., supra, 42 Cal.2d 682, and cases there cited; 
Talbert v. Ostergaarcl, S1tpra, 129 Cal.App.2d 222; James v. 
American Bnslines, 111 Cal.App.2d 273 [244 P.2d 503] .) As 
said in Dierman v. Providence Hospital, supra, 31 CaL2d 290, 
295: "This is not to say that a defendant in a res ipsa loquitur 
case has the burden of proving himself free from negligence . 
. . . [But] [t]he general principle as stated by this court 
in 1919 (in denying a hearing in Bmlrguignon v. Peninsular 
Ry. Oo., 40 Cal.App. 689, 694-695 [181 P. 669]) 'that where 
the accident is of such a character that it speaks for itself, 
as it did in this case, ... the defendant will not be held blame-
less except upon a showing either (1) of a satisfactory ex-
planation of the accident, that is, an affirmative showing of a 
definite cause for the accident, in whick cause no element of 
negligence on the part of the defendant inheres, or (2) of s1wk 
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care 'in all possible respects as necessarily to lead to the con-
that the accident could not have happened from want 
can', but must have been due to some nnpreventable cause, 
the exact eanse is unknown." (Emphasis added.) 
_\!]([ in James v. American supra, 111 Cal.App.2d 
276: "~Where an accident is of such a character that 
l!H~ doetriJJC of res ipsa loquitur applies, cannot 
exeept upon a sbmving either (a) of a 
explanation of the aeei<lent, that an affirmative 
a definite eause for the aceident in which cause 
no efr;mcnt of negligence on the part of the defendant inheres, 
or (b) of such care in all possible respects as necessarily to 
{cad to the conclusion that the accident could not have hap-
fnml~ want of care, but must have been due to some 
Hnpreventable cause although the exaet cause is unknown.'' 
(I£mphasis added.) 
In the instant case defendant did not eliminate all elements 
of negligence on his part in rebutting the res ipsa loquitur 
inference of negligenee. 'l'he majority opinion disensses this 
matter from the standpoint of >Yhether defendant showed 
that he did not have exclusiYe control of his car (an clement 
of the res ipsa loquitur doetrinr.) but the real issue is whether 
be has rebutted the inference of negligence beeause at the tirnc 
the defendant's negligence wonld have occurred, when he 
was approaching and crossing the intersection, he was, with-
out dispute, in full control of his car.'kc As I have said, de-
fondant did not show due care in all rrspects at that time. 
He said he was traveling only 20 miles per hour west on 'l'hird 
Street when he approaehed the intersection with Arizona 
Street and he saw an automobile travrling north on Arizona 
;)() fret south of the intersection when he was 20 feet east of 
the intersection; that he did not see defendant's car again 
until it 1n1s 8 to 10 feet from him and he was in the inter-
section and it was traveling at 50 miles per hour. Obviously 
through laek of attention or deliberately, he drove into the 
path of a vehicle traveling 50 miles an hour when he had 
ample time to stop. At that speed he must have known that 
the car could not stop at the intersection, yet he proceeded 
across the interseetion and into its path. He thus has not, as 
a matter of law, eliminated all negligence on his part and 
~"The exclusive control in res ipsa loquitur is at the time of the negli-
gence rather than at the time of the injury. ( Gonlon v. Aztea Brewing 
Co., 33 Cal.2d [)14 [203 P.2d [)22]; Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
24 Cal.2d 453 [150 P.2d 436].) 
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shown the exercise of due care in every respect. It must be 
remembered that we are not considering the liability as 
between the other car and defendant but between defendant 
and plaintiffs who had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
accident. Certainly, the evidence shows some negligence on 
defendant's part rather than a total absence thereof. More-
over, even if we speak of control by defendant at the time 
of the collision with plaintiffs' house, the most defendant 
testified to was that he "must" have put his foot on the 
accelerator after the impact, that was merely his deduction 
from the facts, not evidence as to them. I would hold there-
fore that defendant failed as a matter of law to rebut the 
inference of his negligence and the judgment must be reversed, 
but there is more . 
.At least we have a case where defendant's negligence has 
been established both by reason of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur and defendant's own testimony. In such case it 
cannot be doubted that the instruction given was error and 
prejudicial to plaintiffs.* It is true that plaintiffs did not 
request a res ipsa loquitur instruction but the jury is entitled 
to draw the inference even though not so instructed. (Rogers 
v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 45 Cal.2d 414 [289 P.2d 226], 
and cases cited.) The instruction given, S1tpra, :flies squarely 
in the teeth of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The very essence 
of that doctrine, where applicable, is that the happening of 
the accident does give rise to an inference of negligence; the 
instruction says it does not. It is fallacious to reason that 
plaintiffs did not show the applicability of the doctrine for, 
as seen, it was clearly applicable, and even though, as shown 
by defendant's testimony, he lost control of his car when he 
collided with plaintiffs' house, he unquestionably had control 
at the legally important time when he entered and crossed 
the intersection-when his negligence occurred (see authori-
ties cited supra). It has been held that the instruction here 
given is inconsistent with one on res ipsa loquitur, and ground 
for granting a new trial. (Brown v. George Pepperdine 
Foundation, 23 Cal.2d 256 [143 P.2d 929] ; England v. Hos-
pital of Good Samaritan, 22 Cal..App.2d 226 [70 P.2d 692] ; 
see Kahn v. Triest-Rosenberg Cap Co., 139 Cal. 340 [73 P. 
164] .) Indeed, it is held that it tells the jury the doctrine does 
*The instruction given reads: ''The mere fact that an accident hap-
pened, considered alone, does not give rise to legal inference that it was 
caused by negligence or that any party to this accident was negligent.'' 
(Emphasis added.) 
:M:ar. 1957] BARRERA v. DE· LA ToRRE 
[48 C.2d 166; 308 P.2d 724] 
177 
not apply. (Connor v. Atchison etc. Ry. Co., 189 Cal. 1 [207 
P. 378, 22 A.L.R. 1462] .) This court said in Brown v. 
George Pcppcrdinc Foundation, 23 Cal.2d 256, 261 [143 P.2d 
929]: "The court, at the request of appellant, instructed the 
jury . . . that 'The mere fact that an accident happened, 
considered alone, does not support an inference that some 
party or any party to this action ·was negligent.' ... Under 
appellant's theory of how the accioent occurred the instruc-
tion is not erroneous when considered with certain other in-
structions. It may have conf?rsal tl1e jnry, however, in view 
of imJtruetion No. 30 whieh states that 'The inferenee of the 
negligence which yon may· draw in this case from the fact of 
the happening of the accident itself shifts the burden to the 
defendants of explaining the manner in which the accident 
happened. . . . ' (Italics added.) These two instructions 
contain inconsistent ideas and the Jury may have been con-
fused the1·eby." (Emphasis added.) The cases relied upon 
by the majority are either distinguishable or plainly wrong 
and contrary to the Pepperdine and England cases. In 
111iddleton v. Post 1'ransp. Co., 106 Cal.App.2d 703 [235 P.2d 
855], the court cites no authority except a Missouri case for 
its holding. It does not refer to the Pepperdine and England 
cases. The reasoning in that case contained in the quotation 
therefrom that the instrnction is a correct statement of the 
law because the jury might find that certain elements of res 
ipsa loquitur were not present is of no help because they are 
told that this is not a case of res ipsa loquitur-there is no 
inference of negligence from the happening of the accident; 
they were told flatly in one breath that there was no such 
inference and in the next by the res ip::;a loquitur instruction 
that there might be if certain other conditions were present 
such as exelusiYe control and defendant must be better able 
to explain the accident. The latter factor is not a necessary 
prerequisite to res ipsa loquitur (Bttrr v. Sherwin Williams 
Co., supra, 42 Cal.2d 682; Sencris v. Jiaas, 45 Cal.2cl 811 [291 
P.2d 915] ), and the argument in the majority opinion that 
this case is different becmlSe two cars driven independently 
were involved, is not 11ertinent (see Godfrey v. Brown, supra, 
220 Cal. 57). This case is more like those in which "because 
of the nature of the particular accident, an inference of negli-
gence ... may be (is) so strong that no reasonable man could 
fail to accept it. ... " (Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., supra, 
42 Cal.2d 682, 689.) In Silva v. Pacific Greyhmtnd Lines, 
119 Cal.App.2d 284 [259 P.2d 743], two vehicles were in-
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yolve(l and the instruction in question was held not prejn-
clieial b(•eause it ·was dosely "tie(1 into the instnwtion ·which 
relates to tlw ncgligmwe of the operator of another- vehielc." 
HPre 11·e haye no sneh tyi11g in with the ear with whieh 
tlefeiH1aut ,;ait1 he eolli<1ed; the driYPr of the otl1cr ear was 11ot 
a party an<1 the iw-:trudion says there is no inference of 
negligPlH'e as to a party to this al:(·i<lenL The instrnetiou in 
Ba:?.ufi \". }ianec's Sanitarium, Inc., 10!1 Cal.App.2<1 232 [240 
I' .2d 6/2 J, was not the sanw al' the one hen~ given. I 11 
8ccd!Joru v. Luhcwood Oanlr:ns etc. Assn., JOG Cal.App.2d 
i4!l [2:3:3 l'.2d !14:3], the jmy \H're in efl'cd told that the 
instrndion gin•n in the instant ea:se cli(1 not prev(•ut the 
i ILfen'lH'(' f-:aid to arise nncler the res ipsa loq nitnr doetrine. 
'!'he 1'easo11ing of the majority that, as wlwu the instant 
insirnd ion and those on res ipsa loqnitnr arc both given, 
there is 110 prejudicial error, there ean he none where only 
tlw in:-:tant one is given, is not tenable. 'l'hat <loes not follow 
for "·here both are g·iwll the jnry is at lrast told ther-e is an 
infercml' althongh they are also advised to the contrary. 
Bnt -where tl]('y are told, as here, that th<'n' is no infen•nce, 
the1·e is nothing left for tlw jury to do except flnd no liability. 
All,\" jnt'y wonl<1 natnrally infer that the drivet· of the ear 
whidl erashed iuto a man's home was negligent bnt when they 
are speeifieally told, as they were here, that tlwy conld not 
~o infer, there was nothing left for them to do except find 
for llcfendant. Unquestionably the instruetion was erroneous 
an<1 hig'hly prejndieial. The jury was instructed that there 
eon1c1 be no n•eoYery nnlcsR it was proved that defendant 
was negligent and that there was no inference of negligenee. 
Plaintiffs ·were giwn no omJOrtunity to reeoyer inasmuch as 
tlw nature of the aeeicleut 1ras sneh that they eonld not prove 
negligf'nt eonclnct on the part of defendant exeept by in-
ference. 
The majorit.\- hol(1s that plaintifis eannot rely on the tllf'ory 
of trespass be('anse it was not nrgerl in the trial eonrt. Even 
a~:-mming tbat dl•f('lHlant loRt control of his ear because of 
its eollision with the other ear, and, as a result it ran into 
plaintiffs' home, yet he would be liable for trespass if his 
negligenec eontributed to his loss of control (Rest., Torts, 
~§ 165, lGG, 164, HiS), aJHl as we have seen, defendant was 
neg] igent as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' eomplaint and proof 
l'outainecl all of the elrments of an action for negligent tres-
pass; that theory was therefon present eel in the ease although 
no instructions \Yere offered thereo11. The jury was instructed 
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1lmt plaintiffs eonl(l not n'\'OYPI' nnless (1ef<'1H1ant IYas Jlegli-
'rhose ills1rndiom; were not framed on the theory 
of trespass and \Yere for that reason erroneous. 'J'he mere fact 
that the theory of trespass as snd1 was not mentioned can 
make no cliffercnce. 
I ·would reverse the judgment. 
[L. A. No. 24145. In Bank. Mar. 22, 1957.] 
Estate of WII.;LlNOilE lVL POSSELMAN, Deceased. HAH-
RIE'J' PALMEll, Appellant, v. CIIARIJES P. SAL-
KELD, as Executor, etc. et al., Respondents. 
Wills-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-Testamentary in-
competency on a given day may be proved by evidence of in-
competency at times prior to and after the day in question. 
[2] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Presumptions and Inferences.-
vVhen it is shown that testamentary incompetency exists and 
that it is caused by a mental disorder of a general and con-
tinuous nature, the inference is reasonable, and there may 
even be a legal presumption (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, sub d. 32), 
that the incompetency continues to exist, and such an inference 
is particularly strong where decedent was suffering from senile 
dementia. 
[3] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-A determination that 
testatrix was of unsound mind when she executed holographic 
documents offered for probate as codicils to her will was sus-
tained by testimony of a bank official, an attorney, a doctor 
and a psychiatrist from which the trial court could reasonably 
conclude that during a three-year period prior to her death 
the testatrix was suffering from senile dementia in an ad-
vanced stage and that she could not comprehend the extent 
and character of her property or her relation to those who 
would be the natural objeds of her bounty, while said docu-
ments were executed during the last two years. 
[4a, 4b] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-A determination 
that testatrix was suffering from an insane delusion as to a 
legatee's identity, and that such delusion was the effective 
cause of the execution of purported codicils, was sustained by 
evidence that she persistently claimed that the legatee was an 
old friend who had worked for testatrix' mother despite re-
peated explanations to the contrary. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 10; Am.Jur., Wills, § 104. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, §45(1); [2] Wills, §63; [3] 
Wills,§ 71; [4] Wills,§ 75; [5] Wills,§ 69. 
